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Abstract
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Introduction
Oﬃ   cially, Indian policymakers have always been concerned with the reduction of poverty and inequality. 
However, between the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve year plan after independence in 1947 and the turn of the century, Indian 
economic policy making went through a sea of change. After independence and for a period of about forty 
years, India followed a development strategy based on central planning. As Chakravarty (1987) pointed out, 
one of the reasons for adopting an interventionist economic policy was the apprehension that total reli-
ance on the market mechanism would result in excessive consumption by upper-income groups, along with 
relative under-investment in sectors essential to the development of the economy. According to Chakravarty 
(1987: 10), policymakers in India adopted a middle path, in which “there was a tolerance towards income 
inequality, provided it was not excessive and could be seen to result in a higher rate of growth than would 
be possible otherwise.” In this context however, the macroeconomic sensitivity to inﬂ  ation as fallout from 
growth reﬂ  ected government concerns regarding the redistributive eﬀ  ects of inﬂ  ation, which typically af-
fected workers, peasants and unorganized sectors more.
From the mid-1980s, the Indian government gradually adopted market-oriented economic reform 
policies. In the early phase, these were associated with an expansionist ﬁ  scal strategy that involved additional 
ﬁ  scal allocations to the rural areas, and thus counterbalanced the redistributive eﬀ  ects of the early liberaliza-
tion. Th   e pace of policy change accelerated during the early 1990s, when the explicit adoption of neo-liberal 
reform programs marked the beginning of a period of intensive economic liberalization and changed at-
titudes towards state intervention in the economy. Th   e focus of economic policies during this period shifted 
away from state intervention for more equitable distribution towards liberalization, privatization and glo-
balization. Th   is study focuses on the period when these neo-liberal and market-oriented economic policies 
were being implemented in India. However, it should be noted that the Indian experience with such policies 
over this period was more limited, gradual and nuanced than in many other developing countries, with cor-
respondingly diﬀ  erent economic eﬀ  ects. Th   is paper gives an overview of the nature and causes of inequality 
trends since the mid-1990s and tries to explain the observed trends.
Trends in income and consumption inequality in India
Th   e debate on economic policy and reform began in India in the 1980s, and continues today. Prior to the 
extensive introduction in 1991 of the new economic policy, as it came to be known, there was widespread 
apprehension that liberalization and excessive reliance on market forces would lead to increases in regional, 
rural-urban and vertical inequalities in India. Nearly ﬁ  fteen years later, the issue is still under debate, with 
various studies unable to give an unequivocal verdict. Economists continue to disagree on whether income 
and consumption inequality increased in India during the reform period.
A number of studies based on the National Sample Survey (NSS) estimates of household consump-
tion expenditure reveal mixed evidence on aggregate and regional trends. For example, Bhalla (2003) re-
ported that both urban and rural Gini coeﬃ   cients declined between 1993-1994 and 1999-2000 (Table 1). 
According to his calculations, rural inequality decreased in 15 out of 16 major states of India, and urban 2  DESA Working Paper No. 45
inequality declined in 8 of the 17 states over this period. He therefore concluded that inequality had not 
worsened in India during the period of reform.
Another study by Singh and others (2003) could not ﬁ  nd strong evidence of increases in household 
inequality for the period 1993-1994 to 1999-2000. According to Singh and others (2003: 12), “there are 
some indications of increases in regional inequality, but they are neither uniform nor overly dramatic”. Singh 
and others also studied convergence of economic performance at a sub-state level. Using a set of ﬁ  ve variables 
(petrol sales, diesel sales, bank credit, bank deposits and cereal production), their study found that during 
the post reform period, some states experienced increasing within-state inequality.
Th   e Government of India National Human Development Report (2001) published the state-wide 
Gini coeﬃ   cients for the years 1983, 1993-1994 and 1999-2000. Th  ese  coeﬃ   cients were estimated using the 
38th, 50th & 55th rounds of Household Consumer Expenditure survey conducted by the National Sample 
Survey (NSS) of India. Comparing the level of inequality between 1993-1994 and 1999-2000, among the 
32 states and union territories reported showed that seven states experienced an increase in rural inequality 
and ﬁ  fteen states experienced an increase in urban inequality. Th   ere were ﬁ  ve states where both urban and 
rural inequalities increased. It is interesting to note that all these ﬁ  ve states were located in the North-Eastern 
part of India1.
1  States and Union Territories where Rural Inequality has increased: Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, 
Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Arunachal Pradesh. States and Union Territories where Urban Inequality has 
increased: Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, 
Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Daman and Diu. Both urban and rural inequality has increased in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, 
Nagaland and Sikkim.
Table 1.
Consumption distribution of India, 1983 to 1999-2000
Consumption Distribution, NSS
Share of: 1983 1987-1988 1993-1994 1999-2000
Rural Quintile 1 8.9 9.3 9.6 10.1
Quintile 2 13.1 13.2 13.5 14.0
Quintile 3 16.7 16.5 16.9 17.3
Quintile 4 21.7 21.3 21.6 21.9
Quintile 5 39.6 39.6 38.5 36.7
Gini 30.4 29.9 28.6 26.3
Urban Quintile 1 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9
Quintile 2 12.1 11.7 11.9 11.7
Quintile 3 15.8 15.5 15.7 15.7
Quintile 4 21.5 21.4 21.6 21.7
Quintile 5 42.6 43.4 42.8 43.0
Gini 33.9 35.0 34.4 34.7
National Quintile 1 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9
Quintile 2 12.5 12.4 12.4 12.6
Quintile 3 16.2 15.8 15.9 16.0
Quintile 4 21.4 21.1 21.1 21.1
Quintile 5 41.4 42.1 41.8 41.4
Gini 32.5 32.9 32.5 32.0
Source: Bhalla (2003).Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          3
It is also notable that during the reform period, urban inequality in India was much higher than ru-
ral inequality for most of the states. In fact, in 31 of the 32 states and union territories, urban inequality was 
higher than rural inequality. Th   is was also reﬂ  ected in the all India ﬁ  gures, which showed that urban inequal-
ity remained higher than rural inequality in all the reference years. Moreover, it could also be seen that from 
1983 to 1999-2000, the rural Gini declined consistently, but there was a gradual rise in urban inequality 
during the same period (See Figure 1).















Using data from diﬀ  erent rounds of the National Sample Surveys, Jha (2004) calculated rural and 
urban inequality in India. Table 2 reﬂ  ects Jha’s results for the period 1993-1994 to 1999-2000. It shows that 
both rural and urban Gini coeﬃ   cients increased in the period between 1993-1994 and 1997, and declined 
between 1997 and 1999-2000. However, as Jha pointed out, and as discussed below, changes in the method-
ology used in the 55th round National Sample Survey meant that the results for 1999-2000 were not compa-
rable to earlier rounds. Th   erefore, care should be taken not to interpret the lower Gini coeﬃ   cients of 1999-
2000 as a sign of declining inequality in India.
Source: Government of India, National Human Development Report (2001).
Table 2. 
Trends in rural and urban inequality in India
1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1997 1999-2000a 1999-2000b
Rural Gini 28.50 29.19 28.97 30.11 26.22 26.33
Urban Gini 34.50 33.43 35.36 36.12 34.40 34.25
Source: Jha (2004), 1999-2000a –Using 30 day recall method, 1999-2000b – Using 7 day recall, the shorter recall period was used 
in the 55th round.4  DESA Working Paper No. 45
Most studies have used various rounds of NSS consumption expenditure survey statistics for calcu-
lating per capita incomes and Gini coeﬃ   cients. But there is a well known problem of lack of comparabil-
ity of NSS statistics between the latest (55th round, 1999-2000) round and the earlier ones. As Sen (2001) 
pointed out, the reference periods in the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the 55th round of NSS survey 
were changed from the uniform 30 day recall, used till then, to both seven and 30 day questions for items 
of food and intoxicants and to 365 day questions for items of clothing, footwear, education, institutional 
medical expense and durable goods. As Deaton and Dreze (2002) explained, the change from 30 to 365 days 
in the reporting period for these low frequency items possibly led to lower poverty and inequality estimates. 
According to them, the longer reporting period reduced the mean expenditures on these items, but because 
a much larger fraction of people reported something over the longer reporting period, the bottom tail of the 
consumption distribution was pulled up, and as a result, both inequality and poverty were reduced.
According to estimates by Sen and Himanshu (2005), the new methodology lowered the measured 
rural poverty in India by almost 50 million. As a consequence, rural inequality measures were also aﬀ  ected. 
Revised estimates of rural inequality had been calculated by Deaton and Dreze (2002), Sundaram and Ten-
dulkar (2003a, 2003b) and Sen and Himanshu (2005). In general, these studies revealed that although the 
unadjusted data showed decreasing inequality between rounds 50 and 55, the adjusted (comparable) data 
suggested that rural inequality had, in fact, gone up in India between 1993-1994 (50th round) and 1999-
2000 (55th round). Sen and Himanshu argued that the adjusted ﬁ  gures indicated that the more accurate 
change in rural inequality between the 50th and 55th rounds was an almost three Gini point increase, rather 
than a two Gini point decline. Deaton and Dreze (2002) and Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003b) also came to 
the conclusion that rural inequality increased in the period between 1993-1994 and 1999-20002.
Sen and Himanshu (2005) provided striking evidence about increased inequality in India in the 
post-reform period. Based on indices of real Mean Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE) by fractile groups, Sen 
and Himanshu showed that whereas the consumption level of the upper tail of the population, including the 
top 20 per cent of the rural population, went up remarkably during the 1990s, the bottom 80 per cent of the 
rural population suﬀ  ered during this period (Figure 2). Th   is graph clearly shows that the consumption dis-
parities between the rich and the poor and between urban and rural India increased during the 1990s. Th  ese 
ﬁ  ndings are based on the NSS ‘thin sample’ surveys, conducted annually since 1986. Th   ese surveys are not as 
comprehensive as the NSS comprehensive rounds or the ‘thick sample’ surveys, but provide suﬃ   ciently good 
estimates at the national level. Also, these thin sample results are comparable because they use a common 
type of questionnaire.
Similarly, using adjusted NSS data, Deaton and Dreze (2002) found three distinct trends of chang-
ing patterns of inequality during the 1990s. Th   ey showed that there is strong evidence of divergence in per 
capita consumption across states. Secondly, their estimates of state-wise per capita expenditure revealed that 
rural-urban inequality in per capita expenditure signiﬁ  cantly increased at an all-India level. Th   ey also found 
2  According to Deaton and Dreze (2002), the direct use of the 55th round—with no adjustment—shows a substantial 
reduction in inequality within the rural sectors of most states, with little or no increase in the urban sectors. But when 
corrections are made, results show that intra-state rural inequality has not fallen, and there have been marked increases 
in intra-state urban inequality. Sundaram and Tendulkar’s ﬁ  ndings show that unadjusted Gini indices for rural India 
are 28.6 and 26.3 from the unadjusted 50th and 55th Rounds respectively. Th   is shows a decline in rural inequality. 
However, the revised and comparable estimate of Sundaram-Tendulkar (2003b) shows that the revised 50th round 
rural Gini was only 25.8. Th   is implies that according to the revised data, rural inequality has gone up between the 50th 
and the 55th Rounds. It is also notable that the urban Gini also increased from 31.9 (50th round Mixed Recall Period) 
to 34.8 in the 55th round.Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          5
strong evidence of increased rural-urban inequalities within states between 1993-1994 and 1999-2000. Jha 
(2004) also concluded that in both rural and urban sectors, all-India level inequality was higher during the 
post reform period than it was during the crisis period of the early 1990s.
Banerjee and Piketty (2001) also highlighted disproportionately large income/consumption gains by 
the upper tail of the population. Based on income tax reports, they found that in the 1990s, the real incomes 
of the top one per cent of income earners in India increased by about 50 per cent (Figure 3). Furthermore, 
among this top one per cent, the richest one per cent increased their real incomes by more than three times 
during the 1990s. Figure 3 shows the real income of the top one per cent of income earners in India as a 
share of total income. Banerjee and Piketty argued that the U-shaped pattern depicted in ﬁ  gure 3 was broad-
ly consistent with the evolution of economic policy in India. While the ‘socialist policies’ of the early part of 
the planning period shrank the income share of the top earners very substantially until the mid-1980s, more 
open and pro-market policies have since allowed the ultra-rich to increase their share substantially.
 Sen and Himanshu also provided state wide rural and urban Gini coeﬃ   cients for the 50th round 
and the 55th round NSS surveys. Th   ese Gini coeﬃ   cients were comparable because they were based on ad-
justed data for the 50th and 55th rounds. Table 3 shows the Gini coeﬃ   cients, where it can be seen that for the 
rural sector, eight of the ﬁ  fteen states experienced a decline in inequality, while in seven others, inequality 
increased.3 On the other hand, it was noteworthy that for all the 15 major states, urban inequality increased 
by 1999-2000 as compared to 1993-1994.
Regional inequality
Th   ere was a sharp increase in regional inequality in India during the 1990s. In 2002-2003, the per capita 
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) of the richest state, Punjab, was about 4.7 times that of Bihar, the 
poorest state. Th   is ratio had increased from 4.2 in 1993-1994. A time-series graph of this ratio shows that 
3  Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Punjab and Tamilnadu
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the disparity between the richest and 
poorest state shot up remarkably during 
the 1990s (Figure 4). Th   is has been 
highlighted by Ghosh and Chan-
drasekhar (2003), who showed that 
inter-state inequality increased sharply 
in India during the reform period. As 
the authors pointed out, based on per 
capita SDP, the basic hierarchy of the 
Indian states remained the same dur-
ing the reform period, with Punjab, 
Haryana and Maharashtra at the top, 
and Bihar and Orissa at the bottom. 
Th   ey also noted that the gap between 
the richest and poorest states opened 
up considerably after 1990-1991. To 
illustrate this, the authors benchmarked 
the average per capita net SDP of the 
three richest states (Punjab, Haryana 
and Maharashtra against the average 
per capita net SDP of the two poorest 
states (Bihar and Orissa) (See Figure 4).
Figure 3. 
India; Real income of top one per cent of income earners as a share of total income
Source: Banerjee and Piketty (2001).
Table 3. 
Gini coeffi   cientsa
Rural Urban
  50th round 55th round 50th round 55th round
Andhra Pradesh 24.9 23.8 30.3 31.7
Assam 17.6 20.3 28.3 31.2
Bihar 20.9 20.8 29.7 32.3
Gujarat 22.3 23.8 26.9 29.1
Haryana 26.9 25.0 26.7 29.2
Karnataka 24.3 24.5 30.4 33.0
Kerala 27.2 29.0 32.3 32.7
Madhya Pradesh  25.0 24.2 29.7 32.2
Maharashtra 26.7 26.4 33.5 35.5
Orissa 22.4 24.7 29.4 29.8
Punjab 23.8 25.3 26.5 29.4
Rajasthan 23.5 21.3 26.8 28.7
Tamilnadu 28.2 28.4 32.8 39.1
Uttar Pradesh 25.2 25.0 30.2 33.3
West Bengal 23.8 22.6 32.7 34.3
All India 25.8 26.3 31.9 34.8
Source: Sen and Himanshu (2005).
a Using comparable estimates for the 50th and 55th round NSS SurveysInequality in India: A survey of recent trends          7
Ahluwalia (2002) also highlighted the trend of increasing inequality among states by using per 
capita gross state domestic product data for the period 1980-1981 to 1998-1999. Th   e trend of the Gini coef-
ﬁ  cient indicating inter-state inequality is shown in Figure 5, which conﬁ  rms that inter-state inequality grew 
steadily in India with liberalization.
More evidence on increasing inter-state inequality came from Singh and others (2003), who used 
regressions to check convergence in per capita consumption expenditures across states. Th   e study found ab-
solute divergence of inter-state per capita consumption expenditures for the periods 1983 to 1999-2000 and 
1993-1994 to 1999-20004. A convergence exercise by Jha (2004) indicated that the ranking of states with re-
spect to inequality had not changed in the reform period. According to his ﬁ  ndings, inter-state convergence 
of the level of inequality was weak.
Poverty Trends in the 1990s
In addition to the discussion on inequality in India during the 1990s, there is a similar debate on the extent 
of poverty reduction during this same period. Th   is debate essentially centres on two controversial and inter-
linked issues.
During the early 1990s, it was observed that average consumption estimates, measured using Na-
tional Accounts Statistics (NAS) data, tended to be consistently higher than NSS consumption data. Con-
4  For the post-reform period, the divergence was weaker, the coeﬃ   cient “not quite signiﬁ  cant at the 10% level, using a 
two-sided test”. (Singh and others, 2003: 5).
Figure 4. 
Widening Disparity between the Richest and Poorest States
Ratio of Per Capita Net State Domestic 
Product of the Richest (Punjab) and the 
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Product of 3 Richest States (Punjab, 
Haryana, Gujarat) and the two poorest 






















































































Source: Banerjee and Piketty (2001).8  DESA Working Paper No. 45
sequently, NSS data showed higher poverty in India than NAS data. It must be emphasized here that NAS 
data are not the most appropriate to use because poverty estimates crucially depend on the distribution of 
incomes, and reliable poverty estimates cannot be directly obtained from NAS data in the absence of income 
distribution data. However, in spite of this NAS data limitation, the discrepancy between NAS and NSS 
poverty estimates fuelled a debate about the relative merit of sample surveys and national accounts statistics 
in India. Some proponents of the reform measures suggested that in the absence of any real evidence that 
consumption inequality has widened among the poor, NAS data essentially indicated that the National Sam-
ple Survey Organization (NSSO) survey results were not giving the right picture. Th   ey argued that surveys 
were unreliable and error prone, and urged a revision of the NSSO survey methodology to bridge the dis-
crepancy between NSS and NAS data5. Among the pro-reformers, the opposition to the NSS methodology 
drew strength from the fact that for the NSS rounds 46 to 54 (1990-1998), poverty was higher than for the 
45th round (1989-1990). Th   ese trends further fuelled the criticism that NSS surveys tended to underestimate 
consumption and eventually led to the changes in the NSS methodology for the 55th round.
Following criticism of the NSS poverty estimates, the methodology used to carry out a large scale 
consumer expenditure survey by the NSSO was modiﬁ  ed in 1999-2000 (the 55th round). Th   is led to serious 
compatibility issues between the 55th round and the previous rounds of NSS surveys. As mentioned before, 
this debate has revolved around the changes introduced in the questionnaire for the 55th round of the sample 
survey and the resultant changes in the data. According to most economists, these changes exaggerate the 
consumption data of the surveyed households, and thereby reduce measured poverty very sharply. It is not 
surprising that the 55th round NSS survey showed a sharp decline in poverty in India. Unadjusted 55th round 
estimates showed that the headcount ratio of poverty declined from 37.3 per cent in 1993-1994 to 27 per 
cent in 1999-2000. Surprisingly, in spite of the well-established shortcomings of the 55th round, the Indian 
Government accepted these ﬁ  gures as the oﬃ   cial poverty estimates.
5  See Minhas (1988) for a comprehensive debunking of the claim that national account statistics are necessarily more 
reliable than sample surveys. 
















































































































































Source: Ahluwalia (2002).Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          9
However, experts readily recognized that these ﬁ  gures could be misleading and spurious. Most 
economists tried to make a more meaningful estimate of the decline in poverty in India by attempting a 
reconciliation of the methodologies used in the 50th and 55th rounds of NSSO surveys. Th   ey attempted dif-
ferent techniques to attain this goal, and not surprisingly, even the comparable results showed considerable 
variation.
At one end of the spectrum is Bhalla (2003), who used NAS data for the computation of poverty, 
and claimed that there was a very sharp decline of poverty in India. According to Bhalla, the oﬃ   cial poverty 
ﬁ  gure of 27 per cent for 1999-2000 was a gross overestimate. His calculations indicated that for the year 
1999, poverty in India was less than 12 per cent. However, Bhalla’s optimism was not shared by those who 
use the NSS data.
Deaton (2005), for example, attempted to reconcile the diﬀ  erences between the 50th round (1993-
1994) and the 55th round of NSS survey, using a methodology suggested by Tarozzi (2003). Th  is  approach 
took into account the items in the questionnaire which were kept unchanged between the 50th and 55th 
rounds. Deaton found that expenditure on these items highly correlated with total household expenditure. 
Using the expenditure pattern on these items, Deaton constructed adjusted and comparable estimates of 
poverty for the 50th and 55th rounds. Calculations by Deaton showed that poverty declined from 37.3 per 
cent in 1993-1994 to 30.2 per cent in 1999-2000. Th   ese results suggested a slightly lower decline of poverty 
than the oﬃ   cial estimates.
In a series of papers, Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003a, 2003b and 2003c) also tried to reconcile 
the results obtained from the 50th and the 55th rounds. Th   ese authors argued that for ‘high’ and ‘intermedi-
ate’ frequency goods, the diﬀ  erence between the 50th and the 55th rounds was insigniﬁ  cant. According to 
them, corrections were only required for low frequency items and for items like clothing, durables, education 
expenses and institutional medical expenses. Using a set of assumptions, Sundaram and Tendulkar found 
signiﬁ  cant poverty reduction during the second half of the 1990s. According to their estimates, poverty de-
clined from 32.15 per cent in 1993-1994 to 27.32 per cent in 1999-2000, which indicated a smaller decline 
in poverty than suggested either by the oﬃ   cial ﬁ  gures or by Deaton. However, there remain some reserva-
tions about Sundaram and Tendulkar’s measures because some of their assumptions underlying their calcula-
tions are considered moot. Secondly, and probably more importantly, they used a diﬀ  erent poverty line than 
the standard one suggested and used by the Planning Commission.
Sen and Himanshu (2005) diﬀ  ered from both Deaton as well as Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003a, b 
and c) in their approach to the problem. Sen and Himanshu relied mainly on recalculation of unit-level NSS 
data from rounds 43, 50 and 55, and made fewer assumptions than the others. Th   eir estimates showed that 
both Deaton as well as Sundaram and Tendulkar had overestimated the decline in poverty. According to the 
comparable estimates calculated by Sen and Himanshu, the head-count poverty ratio in India declined by 
three percentage points at most between the 50th and the 55th rounds, but the number of poor in the country 
actually increased during this period. Th   ese authors also argued that the change in methodology for the 55th 
round of the survey was ill-advised because there was hardly any validity in the criticisms of the 1990-1997 
NSS data and their alleged mismatch with NAS ﬁ  gures. According to them, the growth rate of the NSS 
nominal consumption expenditure was almost identical to that from the then current National Accounts 
series with its 1980-1981 base. Some indication of the varying results that can be obtained by using diﬀ  erent 
methods is provided in Table 4, but the essential conclusion of a slowdown in the rate of poverty reduction 
after 1993 remains.10  DESA Working Paper No. 45
Employment growth and the distribution of income generating opportunities
Th   e most signiﬁ  cant link between growth and poverty reduction is employment generation, which is why 
patterns of employment growth are usually critical in determining both changes in income distribution and 
the incidence of poverty. During the 1990s, the employment growth rate in India plummeted. Table 5 shows 
a very signiﬁ  cant deceleration of employment generation in both rural and urban areas, with the annual 
growth rate of rural employment falling to only 0.67 per cent over the period 1993-1994 to 1999-2000. 
Th   is is not only less than one-third the rate of the previous period 1987-1988 to 1993-1994, but it is also 
less than half the projected growth rate of the labour force in the same period. In fact, it turns out that this is 
the lowest growth rate of rural employment in post-independence history.
Th   e decline in rural employment can be directly at-
tributed to the stagnation of agricultural employment during 
the 1990s. NSSO data indicated that total employment in 
the agriculture sector increased from 190.72 million in 1993-
1994 to 190.94 million in 1999-2000, registering an annual 
growth rate of only 0.02 per cent during this period. Th  is  was 
much lower than the population growth rate over the same 
period (1.67 per cent), and also lower than the corresponding 
ﬁ  gures for earlier periods (Table 6). In fact, the agricultural 
employment growth rate plummeted to its lowest ever mark since the NSS began recording employment 
data in the 1950s.
One of the major reasons behind the poor employment generation during the second half of the 
1990s could have been attributable to the sharp decline in the employment elasticity of output growth 
during this period. Among the sectors, employment elasticities fell in agriculture, mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, 
transport, storage and communication, 
ﬁ  nance and insurance and services sectors. 
In general, the employment elasticity of 
output growth was highest in the tertiary 
sector, followed by the secondary sector. In 
Table 4. 





estimate Method 1 Method 2
Planning 
Commission 
estimate Method 1 Method 2
1977-1978 45.2 45.2  53.1 53.1  
1983 40.8 40.8  45.7 45.6  
1987-1988 38.2 38.2  39.1 39.1  
1993-1994 32.4 32.6 27.9 37.3 37 31.6
1999-2000 23.6  24.8 27.1  28.4
Sources: Government of India, Economic Survey (various years), and Sen and Himanshu (2005)
Note: Method 1 refers to the earlier pattern of questioning with 30 day and 365 day reference periods, while Method 2 refers to the 
new pattern, with 7 day questions also added, as well as diﬀ  erent reference periods for particular commodities.
Table 5. 
Growth rates of employment
Rural Urban
1983 to 1987-1988 1.36 2.77
1987-1988 to 1993-1994 2.03 3.39
1993-1994 to 1999-2000 0.67 1.34




1983 1987-1988 1993-1994 1999-2000
Employment (millions) 151.35 163.82 190.72 190.94
Annual Growth Rate (%) 1.77 2.57 2.23 0.02
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey (various years).Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          11
the reform period, the employment elasticity of agriculture was the lowest, and among the lowest observed 
in Indian agriculture since 1961.
Along with the stagnation of employment generation in the agricultural sector, the real wage growth 
rate of agricultural labourers also stagnated during the 1990s. As Deaton and Dreze (2002) showed, if one 
compared the growth rate of real wages for agricultural labourers with that of public sector salaries, real ag-
ricultural wages grew at about 2.5 per cent per year during the 1990s, whereas public sector salaries grew at 
about 5 per cent per year during the same period. Th   is partly explained the increased rural-urban inequality 
of the 1990s in India.
Sen and Himanshu pointed out that though real wage growth of agricultural labourers was positive, 
its impact on rural per capita income was less signiﬁ  cant because the number of agricultural labourers grew 
faster than the available days for wage employment. Th   e authors showed that according to NSS estimates, 
the percentage of the rural population in agricultural labour households increased from 27.6 per cent to 31.1 
per cent between rounds 50 (1993-1994) and 55 (1999-2000), implying an average of 3.7 per cent annual 
growth of this population. Against this, it reported less than 1.5 per cent average annual growth of wage paid 
days of employment in agriculture. As a result, agricultural unemployment was on the rise, and the increase 
in real wages had not resulted in an increase in the per capita income for rural agricultural workers.
Another observable employment trend was a steady increase in the casualization of the labour force 
in India. Th   e proportion of casual workers increased steadily in rural India. Th   is was matched by a steady 
decrease in the self-employment of workers, both male and female, in rural India. Regular employment for 
rural workers was also abysmally low in India, accounting for less than 7 per cent of all workers. However, 
for urban areas, the share of casual employment for female workers came down over the years and regular 
employment rose. But for male workers, the shares of casual workers and self-employed workers steadily 
increased, and there was a marginal decline in the share of regular employment.
Th   e decline in self-employment in agriculture, which was especially sharp for women, may have been 
related to changes in production conditions, which forced some peasants out of direct cultivation. Th  ere  was 
strong evidence of the declining viability of cultivation in India over the 1990s. A recent study of farm busi-
ness incomes (Sen and Bhatia, 2004) found that average farm business income at current prices deﬂ  ated by 
the CPIAL (Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers) grew at only 1.02 per cent per annum over the 
1990s, compared to 3.21 per cent in the 1980s. Rising input costs and ﬂ  uctuating output prices were found 
to be the dominant cause of this trend. Th   ese numbers were averages for farmers of all size holdings; clearly, 
the situation had been much worse for small and marginal farmers with inferior access to both input and 
product markets. Th   is, in turn, led to a loss of assets, including land, by the small peasantry. It is now clear 
that this period witnessed a signiﬁ  cant degree of concentration of operated holdings, reﬂ  ecting changes in 
both ownership and tenancy patterns. Many small and very marginal peasants lost their land over this period, 
and therefore were forced to search for work as landless labourers. Meanwhile, micro-level surveys reported 
increased leasing-in by large farmers from small landowners. According to NSS data, there was a very large in-
crease in landless households as a percentage of total rural households, from around 35 per cent in 1987-1988 
to as much as 41 per cent in 1999-2000.6 Th   is would deﬁ  nitely have aﬀ  ected the degree of labour intensity 
on farms.
6 Th   is point is elaborated in Ghosh (2005). 12  DESA Working Paper No. 45
Th   e sector-wise distributions of the workforce showed some interesting patterns. Sundaram (2001a, 
2001b)7 showed that if one took a broad deﬁ  nition of the agricultural sector (i.e. agriculture, forestry and 
ﬁ  shing sector), the work force participation rate in agriculture declined steadily between 1961 and 1999-
2000. According to his ﬁ  gures, there was a 16 percentage point decline in the share of the agricultural sector 
in the total workforce. Moreover, between 1993-1994 and 1999-2000, the share of the agricultural sector 
in the total workforce declined twice as fast as the rate of decline over the 33-year period between 1961 and 
1994. As a result, as noted earlier, there was hardly any change in the absolute number of workers in the 
agricultural sector.
Sundaram also showed that of the 16 percentage point decline in the share of the agriculture sector, 
the manufacturing (and repair services) sector and the construction sector gained about 3 per cent each of 
total employment. But the services sector, as a group, recorded a 10 percentage point gain in its share of the 
workforce. About 50 per cent of this increase was caused by the relatively high employment growth rate in 
the trade, hotels and restaurants sector. Th   e transport, storage and communications, as well as the commu-
nity, social and personal services sectors each gained 2 percentage points in their (respective) shares of the 
workforce.
Agriculture still employs about 75 per cent of the total female workforce in India. For rural female 
workers, dependence on agriculture is much higher at around 84 per cent. Data from earlier NSS rounds 
also showed that in 8 of the 17 major states, the share of agriculture in total female rural employment ex-
ceeded 90 per cent; in 15 states, their share was no less than 75 per cent in 1999-2000. Only in West Bengal 
and Kerala, did rural females account for a somewhat higher proportion of non-agricultural employment 
(Chadha and Sahu, 2002). Th   is trend was contrary to the trend observed for male workers. As the NSS data 
showed, there was a steady decline in the proportion of male workers dependent upon the primary sector. 
Increasingly higher proportions of male workers (both rural and urban) were getting employed in secondary, 
tertiary and other non-farm activities, increasing from 22 per cent in 1983 to 29 per cent in 1999-2000.
In this context, the diﬀ  erence between the occupational structures of rural and urban female work-
ers is worth noting. Whereas 37.8 per cent of urban female workers are employed in the services sector, the 
corresponding ﬁ  gure for rural female workers is 4.3 per cent. In spite of the fact that the tertiary sector is 
the fastest growing sector in the Indian economy, the share of rural female workers in this sector has not 
improved in the post-liberalization era. Th  is  diﬀ  erence between rural and urban female workers is a conse-
quence of the fact that in poor developing countries like India, the ability of rural female workers to make 
inter-sectoral shifts in occupation is severely limited by various social and economic factors including their 
education and skill level. It is notable here that in most Indian states, the diﬀ  erences in the education and 
literacy standards between males and females are quite signiﬁ  cant.
Th   e lopsided nature of employment growth in India is evident from Table 7, which shows that em-
ployment in all sub-sectors of the services sector (except community, social and personal services) increased 
much faster than in the rest of the economy. However, in spite of the high rate of employment generation 
in the services sector, poor performance in agriculture and in some industrial sectors has brought down the 
overall rate of employment generation.
7  Sundaram (2001b) uses revised Census 2001 ﬁ  gures for population and workforce data. So the ﬁ  gures from this paper 
may not totally match ﬁ  gures from earlier papers, which have used earlier (and provisional) estimates of population and 
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In India, only about eight to ten per cent of the population is involved in the organized sector. But 
employment generation in this sector suﬀ  ered during the 1990s, mainly because of a decline in employment 
generated by the public sector. However, due to the better performance of the private sector, total employ-
ment generated by the organized sector grew marginally in the period 1995-2001. Th   e deceleration in organ-
ized sector employment was one of the more disconcerting features of the 1990s, especially since industrial 
output increased manifold and the service sector, in which much organized employment was based, was the 
most dynamic element in national income growth. So, along with the deceleration of employment genera-
tion in the rural areas, urban employment generation also suﬀ  ered during the 1990s. However, there was 
some increase in employment opportunities in certain service sub-sectors such as information technology, 
communications and entertainment related services. But the numbers involved remained very small (cur-
rently around 170,000 to 200,000) relative to the size of the labour force and these jobs remain concentrated 
in the larger cities. So this really created some islands of prosperity in an otherwise desperate employment 
scenario.
Th   ere was also a strong gender dimension in the growth rate of organized sector employment. For 
male workers, employment in the organized sector has steadily declined since 1997. Both in private and 
public sector companies, employment of male workers fell. Female workers, on the other hand, have done 
better, and there has been an increase in aggregate organized sector employment for them.
State wise employment generation data also revealed higher levels of inequalities in 1999-2000 than 
in 1993-1994. Th  e  coeﬃ   cient of variation across states increased from 53.7 in 1993-1994 to 63.7 in 1999-
2000. Out of the ﬁ  fteen major states and union territories, only three (Gujarat, Haryana and Karnataka) 
experienced a decline in the unemployment rate during this period (Table 8).
Inequalities in health, nutrition and education
India’s performance in health is one area which has been extremely disappointing over the years. Th  ough 
there have been improvements in some health related indicators like birth and death rates, India’s perfor-
mance in a number of health-related development indicators has been worse than Sub-Saharan Africa’s. Also, 
Table 7. 









Agriculture 1.77 2.57 2.23 0.02
Industry
Mining & quarrying 7.35 1.00 3.68 -1.91
Manufacturing 3.64 1.23 2.26 2.58
Electricity, gas & water supply 2.87 7.19 5.31 -3.55
Construction 12.08 -1.38 4.18 5.21
Services
Trade, hotels & restaurant 4.89 2.99 3.8 5.72
Transport, storage & communication 3.21 3.46 3.35 5.53
Financial, insurance, real estate & 
business services 4.72 4.50 4.60 5.40
Community, social & personal services 3.57 4.06 3.85 -2.08
All Sectors 2.89 2.5 2.67 1.07
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey (various years).14  DESA Working Paper No. 45
the improvements have not been uniform throughout the country. Health services are much better in urban 
areas, and there are diﬀ  erences in the population’s health across diﬀ  erent regions.
Dreze and Sen (2003) pointed out that India has fared much worse than Sub-Saharan Africa in 
nutrition-related indicators such as the proportions of undernourished children, low birth weight babies and 
pregnant women with anaemia. Th   e proportion of females to males in the population is also lower in India 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank data suggest that about 53 per cent of children are undernourished, 
and the proportion of pregnant women with anaemia is as high as 88 per cent. In fact, as far as these indica-
tors are concerned, for all the countries for which data are available, none—except Bangladesh—has fared 
worse than India. Also, if one looks at basic gender inequality data, India is again right at the bottom of the 
world table, along with Pakistan.
On certain other indicators like infant mortality and life expectancy, India’s performance is relatively 
much better, but these ﬁ  gures hide considerable inter-state variations as well as persistent vulnerabilities of 
some segments of the population.8 For example, life expectancy at birth is about 55 in Madhya Pradesh, but 
in Kerala, it is more than 73 (1993-1997 data). Similarly, the number of women per 1000 males varies from 
861 in Punjab to about 1058 in Kerala.
South Indian states have done much better on development-related indicators, including health 
indicators. For example, Kerala’s health indicators are in many ways comparable to those of mid-income and 
high income countries. Kerala’s fertility rate is about 1.8 per cent, which is lower than that of the USA and 
8 Th   ese variations increase with the level of dis-aggregation. For example, according to 1999 data, district-level female 
literacy rates range between 9 and 84 per cent in India.
Table 8. 











to 1999-2000 1999- 2000 1993-1994
1993-1994
to 1999-2000
Andhra Pradesh 30 614 0.35 8.03 6.69 0.067 5.2
Assam 7  647 1.99 8.03 8.03 0.737 2.7
Bihar 30  355 1.59 7.32 6.34 0.353 4.5
Gujarat 18  545 2.31 4.55 5.7 0.316 7.3
Haryana 5 982 2.43 4.77 6.51 0.42 5.8
Himachal Pradesh 2 371 0.37 2.96 1.8 0.052 7.1
Karnataka 20 333 1.43 4.57 4.94 0.188 7.6
Kerala 8 902 0.07 20.97 15.51 0.013 5.5
Madhya Pradesh 28 725 1.28 4.45 3.56 0.272 4.7
Maharashtra 34  979 1.25 7.16 5.09 0.216 5.8
Orissa 11 928 1.05 7.34 7.3 0.262 4
Punjab 8  013 1.96 4.03 3.1 0.426 4.6
Rajasthan 19 930 0.73 3.13 1.31 0.104 7
Tamil Nadu 23 143 0.37 11.78 11.41 0.052 7.1
Uttar Pradesh 49 387 1.02 4.08 3.45 0.185 5.5
West Bengal  22 656 0.41 14.99 10.06 0.056 7.3
All India 336 736 1.07 7.32 5.99 0.16 6.7
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey (various years).Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          15
is comparable to West European rates. 
On the other hand, Dreze and Gazdar 
(1996) show that the performance of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two of the 
most populous states of India, has been 
worse than many Sub-Saharan African 
countries on a large number of health 
indicators. Th   e Human Development 
Index (HDI) of India also shows consid-
erable variations across the states (Table 
9). However, the dispersion of HDI was 
lower in 2001 (coeﬃ   cient of variation 
18.4 per cent, range 0.283) than in 
1991 (coeﬃ   cient of variation 15.7 per 
cent, range 0.271).
It is also interesting to note that 
the inter-state variations in health re-
lated indicators do not always correlate 
with poverty levels. Poverty, as measured 
by the head-count ratio, is higher in the eastern states of Bihar and Orissa, but child death rates are much 
higher in the central and northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Despite poverty 
being lower in Uttar Pradesh, child mortality is more than twice as high in the state as compared to Tamil 
Nadu. Also, gender discrimination is most pronounced in the states of Punjab and Haryana, two of the most 
prosperous states of India. In fact, one of the most disturbing developments in the 1990s was the decline 
in the female-male ratios in the relatively prosperous states of India. Th   e female-male ratio among children 
declined from 945 girls per 1,000 boys (in the 0-6 years age group) in 1991, to 927 girls per 1,000 boys in 
2001. Th   is decline was mainly driven by a combination of social discrimination against female children and 
the spread of prenatal sex-determination technology and sex-selective abortion. Since the largest declines in 
the female-male ratios have occurred in the more prosperous states of Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Punjab and Delhi, it appears that economic growth may have facilitated the spread of sex-selective abortion 
by making sex-determination technology and sex-selective abortion more aﬀ  ordable. Th   ough prenatal sex 
determination has subsequently been banned by the government, given the social stigma, corruption and 
availability of technology, it is diﬃ   cult to say how eﬀ  ective the ban will be.
One of the main reasons behind the poor state of health care facilities in India and the high health-
related inequalities across the states is the very low level of public health expenditure, which happens to be 
among the lowest in the world, at 5.1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, nutrition condi-
tions are acknowledged to have a close relationship with overall health, and here, the conditions may even 
have worsened in recent years. Th   ere have been disturbing changes in consumption patterns, as revealed by 
the NSSO and other sources. Per capita food-grain consumption declined from 476 grams per day in 1990 
to only 418 grams per day in 2001, while aggregate caloriﬁ  c consumption per capita declined from just over 
2,200 calories per day in 1987-1988 to around 2,150 in 1999-2000. Th   is decline was marked, even among 
the bottom 40 per cent of the population, where it was unlikely to reﬂ  ect Engels curve type shifts in con-
sumer choice, but rather relative prices and the inability to consume enough food due to income constraints.
Table 9. 
India, Human Development Index by State
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
Andhra Pradesh 0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416 10
Assam 0.272 10 0.348 10 0.386 14
Bihar 0.237 15 0.308 15 0.367 15
Gujarat 0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6
Haryana 0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5
Karnataka 0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7
Kerala 0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1
Madhya Pradesh 0.245 14 0.328 13 0.394 12
Maharashtra 0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4
Orissa 0.267 11 0.345 12 0.404 11
Punjab 0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2
Rajasthan 0.256 12 0.347 11 0.424 9
Tamil Nadu 0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3
Uttar Pradesh 0.255 13 0.314 14 0.388 13
West Bengal 0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8
All India 0.302 0.381 0.472
Source: Government of India (2001).16  DESA Working Paper No. 45
In India, the literacy rate has been increasing steadily, but still too slowly over the last few decades. 
Th   e Census of India has calculated the country’s overall literacy rate at 65 per cent in 2001, up from about 
43 per cent in 1981 and 52 per cent in 1991. Th   e male-female gap in literacy improved from 26.6 per cent 
in 1981 to 21.6 per cent in 2001, but remains large. Th   ere are signiﬁ  cant inter-state inequalities in literacy 
rates. Even in 2001, Bihar, the state with lowest literacy rate below 50 per cent, was about 18 percent-
age points below the national average. For female literacy, the gap was even wider at about 21 per cent. By 
contrast, Kerala, the state with the highest literacy in India, had an average literacy rate of 90.92 per cent, 
with more than 86 per cent female literacy. Th   ough the diﬀ  erence in literacy rates between the top and the 
bottom states has narrowed in recent 
years, it remains signiﬁ  cant. Along 
with inter-state diﬀ  erences, there exist 
large disparities between the rural and 
urban sectors of the country, as Table 
10 shows. In particular, the literacy 
rate is still shockingly low among rural 
women, with less than half classed as 
literate, even with a restricted deﬁ  nition 
of literacy.
Primary school enrolment in 
India may have increased steadily over the years, but is low even by South Asian standards. Countries like 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have higher primary school enrolment rates than India. Estimates suggest that 
more than 70 million children in the 6 to 14 years age group are either school dropouts or have never been 
enrolled in school at all. Many more children may be formally registered, but barely attend. Th   is is not 
surprising because the bulk of primary schools in the country lack the most basic resources such as, teachers, 
buildings, blackboards, toilets, and textbooks. Dropout rates from schools are very high in India, with girls 
more prone to withdrawing. However, the dropout rate did decline marginally over the 1990s.
Another factor contributing to increased inequality in education in India has been the rapid growth 
of private schools. Over the years, the shares of private un-aided schools have gone up signiﬁ  cantly at pri-
mary, mid-primary and secondary school levels. Th   ere has also been a commensurate decline in the share of 
government schools in these categories. Th   e growth of private un-aided schools has been much higher at the 
secondary and higher secondary levels. Th   ese private un-aided schools are mostly located in urban areas, and 
charge much higher fees than the government or local body schools. Since these private schools mainly cater 
to the richer sections of the population, their rapid growth is indicative of increasing education inequality in 
India.
Factors behind growing inequality and persistent poverty
Th   e earlier discussion shows a perceptible increase in inter- and intra-regional inequality in India during the 
reform period. Th   is inequality is evident, not only in income terms, but also in terms of health and access to 
education. Th   is section discusses some factors which might be responsible for the increase in inequality in 
India during the reform period.
Table 10. 
Literacy rates by location, 1991, 2001
 
1991 2001
Male Female All Male Female All
Rural areas  57.90 30.60 44.70 71.40 46.70 59.40
Urban areas  81.10 64.00 73.10 86.70 73.20 80.30
All areas 64.13 39.29 52.21 75.85 54.16 65.38
Rural-Urban 
diff  erences 23.20 33.40 28.40 15.30 26.50 20.90
Source: Ministry of Education, Government of India website based on census 
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Fiscal policy
An important element of the economic reform process adopted in India was the belief that a high ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit level was responsible for the 1991 crisis, and the deﬁ  cit should therefore be brought down to a certain 
pre-determined target. It was argued that a high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit is bad for an economy because it can be inﬂ  a-
tionary, can give rise to external deﬁ  cits, can lead to high interest rates and therefore crowd-out private in-
vestment, and can put an unsustainable interest rate burden on an economy through accumulation of public 
debt.9 Th   e IMF program required the government to bring down the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit to a level of ﬁ  ve to six per 
cent of GDP from the average of seven per cent of GDP for the period 1985-1990.
However, it was also part of the macro-policy paradigm that taxes should be rationalized and direct 
tax rates should be cut so as to improve “eﬃ   ciency” and provide incentives to private investors. In addition, 
indirect tax rates were cut because of import liberalization and associated domestic duty reductions. Th  is 
meant that ﬁ  scal balance could not be achieved through increased tax revenues, but would have to depend 
upon expenditure cuts. Th   erefore, to achieve this targeted ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit, the government undertook major ex-
penditure cuts during the 1990s (Figure 6). Not surprisingly, the government found it diﬃ   cult to cut current 
expenditure, so massive reductions were made in capital expenditure. As a result, central government capital 
expenditure, as a share of GDP, declined steadily from 7.02 per cent for the period 1986-1987 to 1989-1990 
to 2.74 per cent for the period 1999-2000 to 2002-2003. Public investments in crucial areas like agriculture, 
rural development, infrastructure development and industry were scaled down. Th   is adversely aﬀ  ected the 
9 Th   ese arguments against high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits are often not supported by economic theory. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 
(2002) and Patnaik (2000, 2001a, 2001b) discuss problems of the neo-liberal arguments against high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits
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Source: Ahluwalia (2002).18  DESA Working Paper No. 45
already fragile state of infrastructure in the economy and led to a virtual collapse of public services in areas 
like education, public health and sanitation. As discussed by Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002), not only 
were the plan targets for expenditure scaled down, but there were also huge shortfalls in public investment, 
even relative to these reduced targets, during most years of the decade.
In addition, there was a decline in the central government’s current expenditure on rural develop-
ment accompanied by an overall decline in per capita government expenditure in rural areas. Th  e  decline 
of government investment in rural areas marked a sharp turnaround from the trend observed during the 
early 1980s, when there was a large increase in expenditure on the rural sector. Political developments of 
the 1980s induced various governments to increase the ﬂ  ow of resources to this sector. Th   is led to higher 
demand generation in the rural sector, and consequently resulted in lower poverty, economic diversiﬁ  cation 
and increased rural employment generation. However, over the 1990s, many policies which had contributed 
to this rural development were reversed. Central government expenditure on rural development schemes like 
agricultural programs, rural employment programs and anti-poverty schemes were cut. Th   is had a negative 
eﬀ  ect on rural poverty and employment generation during the 1990s.
Along with the cutback of central government expenditure on the rural sector, there was a gradual 
reorganization of the tax system, which led to reduced ﬁ  nancial transfers to state governments. Th  e  cen-
tral government reduced the Central Sales Tax (CST), introduced non-shareable levies in direct taxes, and 
adopted a value-added tax, all of which reduced the ability of states to generate resources. Since state govern-
ments were the dominant provider of basic services and rural infrastructure, the reduced ability of the state 
to ﬁ  nance these activities resulted in even lower levels of investment in rural sectors. Th   is again, adversely 
aﬀ  ected demand and employment generation in the rural sector.
As part of the cost cutting exercise, subsidies given for food, fertilizer and exports were also reduced 
signiﬁ  cantly. Th   e reduction of the food subsidy crippled the public distribution system (PDS) for food, 
which provided fair-priced food items to a very large number of low-income households. To reduce the 
food subsidy, the government introduced the targeted public distribution system (TPDS). In this system, 
only the households which belonged to the BPL (Below Poverty Line) category were eligible for subsidized 
food through the public distribution system. To reduce the budgetary expenditure on food, in 1999-2000, 
the government tried to increase food prices to equal the economic cost of the Food Corporation of India 
(FCI). Th   is led to a doubling of food prices for the above poverty line (APL) household. Food prices for BPL 
households were also raised by about 80 per cent during this period. At the same time, over the 1990s, the 
government increased the procurement prices of some major food-grains to placate the politically powerful 
farmer lobby. Th   e increase in food prices led to a decline in food purchases by the public from the PDS, so 
stocks held by the FCI increased to three times the desired food-grain stock level, leading to very high stock 
holding costs. So, the attempt to reduce food subsidies by increasing prices paid by consumers had the para-
doxical eﬀ  ect of increasing the public costs of holding food-grain stocks, and thus increased the food subsidy! 
Over this period, per capita food-grain availability in the country actually declined from 510 grams in 1991 
to 458 grams in 2000.
Downsizing of employment in a number of key public sector industries was also undertaken in line 
with the expenditure-cutting exercise. Th   is severely aﬀ  ected employment generation in the public sector 
but, as most studies pointed out, generated only notional ﬁ  scal beneﬁ  ts. Widespread disinvestment and sale 
of the equity of proﬁ  table public sector units were also undertaken during the 1990s. It was argued by the 
policymakers that disinvestment of public sector units (PSUs) would ensure ﬁ  scal discipline and would lead Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          19
to higher levels of eﬃ   ciency. However, as many economists suspected, the real motivation behind the sale 
of PSUs was the accumulation of resources to meet the IMF ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit target. Th   e disinvestment process 
pursued all through the 1990s turned out to be a disaster, as the controversial disinvestment of PSUs in-
volved a number of proﬁ  t making PSUs being sold at low and discounted prices to their global and domestic 
competitors. Not only did this result in a loss to the government exchequer, putting a recurring burden on 
the exchequer, but it also distorted the markets for several commodities and services. Th   ere were also persist-
ent allegations about corruption and malpractice in the sale of PSUs.
As part of ﬁ  scal consolidation, a number of loss-making PSUs were closed down. Since some of 
these actually provided important services to farmers, small enterprises and people in general, their closure 
also had unfortunate productive and distributive implications. Many of these PSUs were not established 
solely as proﬁ  t making companies, but were supposed to achieve various socio-economic targets. So, as a 
result of this process of disinvestment, the ﬁ  scal situation of the government did not improve, while many 
were deprived of the socio-economic beneﬁ  ts provided by many of these PSUs. Th   is is one reason why the 
new government of the United Progressive Alliance, led by the Congress Party, declared that it would halt 
this process of mindless privatization, especially of proﬁ  t-making public companies. Privatization of basic 
services like electricity and transport also raised the prices of these services in many places across India. 
Th  is  deﬁ  nitely contributed to the increased inequality observed during the 1990s. Th   e relatively backward 
regions, where private participation in industry is low, were the worst hit.
Th   e attempt by the government to undergo ﬁ  scal adjustment was essentially a one-track approach. 
In line with the expenditure cutting exercise, very little emphasis was put on improving revenue genera-
tion in the economy. As noted above, the dictates of market-friendly neo-liberal economic policies did not 
allow for increases in direct tax rates or import tariﬀ  s. As a result, the central government’s tax to GDP ratio 
declined from about 11.8 per cent for the period 1987-1988 to 1989-1990 to about 9.6 per cent from 1999-
2000 to 2002-2003.
A number of factors contributed to this decline. First, India initiated trade liberalization from the 
early 1990s, and levels of customs duties were reduced on a large number of goods. During the mid-1990s, 
tariﬀ   rates were reduced further, sometimes even going beyond the level required by WTO obligations. As a 
result, customs duties declined steadily from about 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1990-1991 to about 1.8 per cent 
in 2001-2002. Secondly, a range of excise duty concessions were introduced to boost private sector demand 
and to encourage the growth of private industry. Also, to attract foreign direct investment and foreign 
portfolio investment, a number of ﬁ  scal concessions were given to foreign investors. Huge amounts of tax 
revenue were foregone on these accounts.
Consequently, excise taxes declined from 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-1991 to 3.2 per cent in 
2001-2002. During the mid-1990s, a number of direct tax concessions were also given as incentives to 
boost domestic savings and investment. It was argued that lowering direct tax rates would lead to higher tax 
revenue following the Laﬀ  er curve argument and would increase the buoyancy of tax receipts. However, Re-
serve Bank of India (RBI) data show that over the Eighth and Ninth Plan periods (between 1991-1996 and 
1997-2001), the buoyancy of central government taxes deteriorated from 0.9 to 0.8. Th   ough this decline 
happened mainly on account of indirect taxes, the buoyancy in direct tax collection stagnated at 1.3, and did 
not compensate adequately for the fall in buoyancy of indirect taxes. Th   e restructuring of both direct and 
indirect taxes eﬀ  ected since the early 1990s, coupled with the structural shift in the composition of GDP 
towards the less-taxed services sector, appears to have aﬀ  ected the growth in tax revenue (Table 11).20  DESA Working Paper No. 45
Th   us, it can be concluded 
that the ﬁ  scal policy measures initiated 
in the reform period did not allow 
the government to build up produc-
tive capacity in the economy. Lack of 
public investment dampened aggregate 
demand, negatively aﬀ  ected private 
investments, created infrastructure 
bottlenecks to future growth, and 
adversely aﬀ  ected the provision of 
important public services. Moreover, 
in a developing country, where capital 
expenditure on infrastructure and so-
cial services tends to crowd in private 
investment, reduced expenditure on 
these sectors led to the crowding out 
of private investment. As a result of reduced public and private investment, there was inadequate productive 
employment generation, both in rural and urban areas. Th   is was a key factor behind the increased inequality 
and slow down of poverty reduction in the country.
Financial sector reform
Th   e crisis of 1991 hastened the process of ﬁ  nancial liberalization pursued by the Indian government since 
the mid-1980s. Financial liberalization was designed to accomplish the following objectives: a) make the 
central bank more independent; b) relieve ﬁ  nancial repression by freeing interest rates, and introduce various 
new ﬁ  nancial instruments and innovations in the Indian ﬁ  nancial system; c) reduce directed and subsidized 
credit; and d) allow greater openness and freedom for various forms of external capital ﬂ  ows. It should be 
noted that these objectives were not realized in full, and indeed, the lack of completeness of such ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization has been one important reason for the relative ﬁ  nancial stability of the country, unlike several 
other ‘emerging markets.’
Th   e most adverse eﬀ  ect of ﬁ  nancial liberalization on inequality came from policies which eased 
‘priority sector’10 lending norms for nationalized banks. Until the 1980s, nationalized banks had obligations 
to fulﬁ  l priority sector lending targets. But post-liberalization, the priority sector deﬁ  nition was widened to 
include many more activities, and the emphasis in banking shifted instead towards maintaining the capital-
adequacy level prescribed by the Basle accord. As a result, most banks now avoid lending to small farmers 
and small scale industries, as they are perceived to be less creditworthy customers. Th   is has had dramatic ef-
fects on the viability and cultivation of small enterprises, which are the largest employers in the country, and 
has therefore indirectly impacted income distribution and poverty reduction.
A report by a Reserve Bank of India working group concluded that the recent slowdown in prior-
ity sector lending principally owes to risk aversion due to a high proportion of non-performing loans (RBI 
2004). However, the composition of the non-performing assets (NPAs) of Indian public and private sector 
banks shows a somewhat diﬀ  erent picture. According to RBI data, as of 31 March 2002, 77.91 per cent of 
total NPAs in private sector banks were in non-priority sectors, while priority sectors accounted for only 
10  Priority sector includes agriculture and small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs).
Table 11. 








1990-1991 0.9 0.9 4.3 3.6 10.1
1991-1992 1.0 1.2 4.3 3.4 10.3
1992-1993 1.1 1.2 4.1 3.2 10.0
1993-1994 1.1 1.2 3.7 2.6 8.8
1994-1995 1.2 1.4 3.7 2.6 9.1
1995-1996 1.3 1.4 3.4 3.0 9.4
1996-1997 1.3 1.4 3.3 3.1 9.4
1997-1998 1.1 1.3 3.2 2.6 9.1
1998-1999 1.2 1.4 3.1 2.3 8.3
1999-2000 1.3 1.6 3.2 2.5 8.9
2000-2001 1.5 1.7 3.3 2.3 9.0
2001-2002 1.4 1.6 3.2 1.8 8.1
Source: Reserve Bank of India (various years).Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          21
21.8 per cent of total NPAs. For public sector banks, 53.5 per cent of NPAs were accounted for by non-pri-
ority sectors, 44.5 per cent of total NPAs were in priority sectors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a number 
of big Indian business houses are responsible for a substantial share of the non-priority sector NPAs. Collu-
sion of big business houses with the political elite has prevented strong legal measures against defaulters.
Th   e decline in priority sector lending has led to a signiﬁ  cant reduction in rural credit from formal 
channels, which has had major eﬀ  ects in terms of costs and the feasibility of cultivation. Th   e irony is that the 
rural sector continues to contribute savings in the form of deposits into the banking system, leading to low 
and falling ratios of credits to deposits in rural banks. Th   e reduced access to and higher cost of agricultural 
credit obviously means not just increased costs of cultivation, which has not been given adequate policy at-
tention, but also adversely aﬀ  ected private investment in agriculture.
Another consequence of ﬁ  nancial liberalization has been the high inﬂ  ow of foreign private capital 
into India. A look at the RBI balance sheet shows that since 1993-1994, there has been a sharp increase in 
the Net Foreign Exchange Assets (NFEA) of the RBI. To moderate the growth of Reserve Money, which is 
deﬁ  ned as the sum of Net Foreign Exchange Assets (NFEA) and Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the RBI, 
the RBI had to constrain the growth of NDA. Th   is was partly done by selling domestic currency bonds in 
the market (sterilization), and partly by restricting RBI credit to the domestic sector. As a result, the share of 
NFEA increased from 20.44 per cent in 1992-1993 to 65.01 per cent in 2000-2001 (Figure 7). Th  e  ﬁ  g-
ures show that in recent years, net foreign exchange asset accretion by the banking system became the most 
important source of money supply expansion in India. External compulsion of this kind can have serious im-
plications for macroeconomic and monetary management of the country. If the central bank has to accom-
modate large increases in foreign capital inﬂ  ow, base money supply can only be controlled by sterilization in-
volving a reduction in central bank credit to the domestic sector. While there are obvious analytical problems 
with the view that such sterilization has an eﬀ  ect on broader measures of money supply, the point is that 


























































































Source: Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy (various issues).22  DESA Working Paper No. 45
sterilization aﬀ  ects the government’s own perception of the possibilities of domestic monetary expansion, 
and therefore constrains its ﬁ  scal behaviour. Th   e principal area for such reductions is with regard to central 
bank credit to the government. Th   is substantially increases the ﬁ  scal vulnerability of the state, reducing its 
ability to stimulate growth, sustain welfare measures like subsidies, and increase outlays on social sectors like 
health, education and meeting the basic needs of the population. Th   is further constrained ﬁ  scal policy.
Liberalization of foreign and domestic investment
Extremely skewed inter-state distribution of domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) has also contrib-
uted to increased inter-regional disparities in India. State-wise data on (aggregate) FDI approvals between 
1991 and 2002 show that only a handful of states have managed to attract a very high share of FDI (Figure 
8). From the ﬁ  gures, it can be seen that the top 10 Indian states attracted more than 63 per cent of total 
foreign direct investment in India. In contrast, the bottom 10 states together received less than 1 per cent 
of total FDI. Th   ere is also a strong regional disparity in the pattern of FDI ﬂ  ows, with the southern and 
western states faring much better than the other parts of the country. Th   ree southern states (Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu) received more than 20 per cent of total FDI, while Maharashtra and Gujarat 
(both in Western India) received 17.35 per cent and 7.7 per cent of FDI respectively. In contrast, the seven 
North-Eastern states together received only 0.03 per cent of total FDI during the same period. Th  is  unequal 
distribution of FDI across states in India is not unexpected, as FDI inﬂ  ows tend toward states with better 
infrastructure and development. Th   e concentration of FDI in a few pockets in India therefore did not help 
to reduce inequality during the reform period.
Apart from its very skewed regional distribution, FDI ﬂ  ows in India also exhibit a strong sectoral 
bias. In India, a very high proportion of FDI has gone into high-end consumer goods and ﬁ  nancial services 
like banks, insurance companies and consultancy services. It has also ﬂ  owed into information technol-
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ogy related areas where India’s human resources and research and development (R&D) base have pockets 
of international competitiveness. A large part of the inﬂ  ow also went into the non-tradable infrastructural 
sector, attracted by special concessions, including guaranteed returns, oﬀ  ered by the government for such 
investments. However, beneﬁ  ts accruing from FDI in terms of ﬁ  xed investments, exports and technological 
upgrading have been less than expected. Th   is happened because since the 1990s, a signiﬁ  cant part of FDI 
came in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). As opposed to green-ﬁ  eld FDI investment, M&As 
do not create productive capacity and hence do not beneﬁ  t the host country as much. In fact, there are some 
negative consequences if M&As lead to the formation of monopoly powers in an industry. Also, typically 
with such mergers, employment stagnates or falls. Th   is often counterbalances or even negates the increase in 
employment of multi-national corporation (MNC) aﬃ   liates, so that employment increases tend to be the 
least buoyant of all the major variables associated with MNC production.
Secondly, though FDI worth around $30 billion has come into India since 1991, it has not contrib-
uted to an increase in exports. Most analysts suggest that a high proportion of FDI came into India during 
the early 1990s to jump the ‘tariﬀ   wall’ and service the Indian market, rather than to use the country as an 
export hub. Th   ere were also apprehensions that the initial inﬂ  ow of direct investment would be followed 
by large and persistent outﬂ  ows on account of imports, royalties, technical fees and dividends, with adverse 
balance of payments consequences. Th   ere have also been a few instances of anticompetitive practices by 
some large foreign companies in India. Th   e most famous cases include the tussle between the government of 
Maharashtra and the energy giant Enron, and the buyout of a rival Indian cold drink company Parle Exports 
by Coca Cola.
However, despite the liberalization of rules regarding FDI, India’s performance in attracting FDI 
was not particularly impressive in this period. Whereas China has managed to increase its FDI stock from 
$24 billion in 1990 to $448 billion in 2002, India’s FDI stock increased from $1.6 billion in 1990 to $25.7 
billion during 2002. FDI also ﬁ  nanced only about 2-3 per cent of India’s gross domestic capital formation, 
whereas the corresponding ﬁ  gure for China was around 10-11 per cent.
Patterns of FDI inﬂ  ow in India suggest that the inﬂ  ows are highly concentrated in a few states and 
in some sectors where India can oﬀ  er either a big domestic market or cheap and skilled labour. Th  e  concen-
tration of FDI in relatively small areas has created some illusion of prosperity, but has hardly done anything 
to reduce overall levels of poverty or inequality in India. On the other hand, in a bid to attract FDI to their 
states, many state governments have completely overlooked the rural sector and concentrated their develop-
ment expenditures in the urban areas. Th   is has resulted in increased rural-urban inequality, and has given rise 
to political tension in these states. In the 2004 elections, mainly due to rural discontent, the chief minister of 
Andhra Pradesh was voted out of oﬃ   ce even though Hyderabad, the capital of the state, is one of the main 
hubs of the software industry in India and one of the most favoured FDI destinations in the country.
Along with FDI, domestic private investment has also been regionally skewed. In the reform period, 
decontrol of investment licensing eliminated the central government’s ability to direct investment to particu-
lar areas, especially to backward or undeveloped regions. As a result, private corporate investment increasing-
ly located in areas that could provide them with better support at lower cost. Ahluwalia (2000: 1643) argued 
“Private corporate investment is potentially highly mobile across states and is therefore likely to ﬂ  ow to states 
which have a skilled labour force with a good ‘work culture’, good infrastructure especially power, transport 
and communications, and good governance generally.”24  DESA Working Paper No. 45
As a result of the increased mobility of private capital and the reduced power of the state to direct 
investment to certain areas, the poorer performing states, which suﬀ  er from infrastructure deﬁ  ciencies, re-
main at a serious disadvantage in attracting private investment. Th   is has led to the concentration of domestic 
investment in a few enclaves, and resulted in higher levels of inter-state inequality in India. To address this 
disparity, it is essential that public investment be used to build economic and social infrastructure in these 
states to help them attract a larger ﬂ  ow of private investment.
Trade liberalization
Trade liberalization is essentially inequitable in nature since it distributes income in favour of the export 
sector and against the import competing sector. Unless the gains from trade are redistributed, trade liber-
alization will always change income distribution, which may imply higher inequality. In India, a similar 
phenomenon can be observed, but not necessarily along the lines predicted by traditional Hecksher-Ohlin 
trade theory. Th   e more employment-intensive sectors have been adversely aﬀ  ected, rather than encour-
aged, by trade liberalization. Opening up trade has helped certain sub-sectors, both in manufacturing and 
services, where India is internationally competitive, but mainly in activities using relatively skilled labour 
in the Indian context. By expanding the markets for these sectors, trade liberalization has deﬁ  nitely created 
some pockets of prosperity in India, but on the other hand, it has negatively aﬀ  ected most other manufactur-
ing sectors and agriculture. Th   e situation in agriculture is most disturbing because about 70 per cent of the 
population depends upon this sector. Continued subsidization of agriculture by developed countries and the 
resultant distortion of global agricultural trade is one of the important factors behind the poor performance 
of agriculture. Yet, other macroeconomic policies, such as patterns of public spending and ﬁ  nancial poli-
cies have also played a role. Small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector have also been hit by 
trade liberalization. Typically, employment intensive domestic production has been displaced by imports of 
similar goods using more capital intensive production methods abroad.
Th   ere is also a possibility that increased globalization and reforms may increase the cost of labour, 
and this would encourage capital intensive industrialization (Goldar, 2002). Th   is can happen because: (a) an 
increase in relative food prices would increase the cost of labour in the form of higher wages; (b) reduction 
of tariﬀ  s in capital goods sector may lead to cost advantages in favour of capital; (c) foreign competition and 
greater export drive may also encourage more capital intensity. Th   erefore, a freer trade regime may not neces-
sarily lead to higher employment generation in a country; this is supported by India’s experience thus far.
In this context, it is notable that in a liberalized trade regime, it is important that most workers 
possess some ability to shift jobs between sectors because trade liberalization is likely to induce the relocation 
of labour. Opening up trade leads to job losses in import competing industries and increases employment 
opportunities in export sectors. If socio-economic conditions prevent workers from making this transition 
smoothly, or if the rate of new job creation is not fast enough, then it may result in even higher levels of 
inequality than those already prevailing in the economy. It is the duty of the government to equip and train 
workers to build up the requisite skills to make such inter-sectoral shifts. However, the increased withdrawal 
of the state in India from most welfare-related issues suggests that the adjustment to trade liberalization is 
going to be a painful process, and the gap between the beneﬁ  ciaries of trade liberalization and those who 
have not managed to beneﬁ  t from it, will increase in the immediate future unless alternative policies are 
introduced.Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          25
Conclusion
In India, although there are claims that inequality has decreased in the post-liberalization period, careful 
analysis of data shows that these views are mostly unsubstantiated. Comparable estimates of the 50th (1993-
1994) and 55th (1999-2000) rounds of National Sample Survey data reveal that inequality increased both in 
rural and urban India. Several authors have also pointed out that though the richer sections of the popula-
tion beneﬁ  ted in the post-liberalization period, there has been a stagnation of incomes for the majority, with 
the bottom rung of the population severely negatively aﬀ  ected by this process. Th   ere is also evidence that, 
both at the national and the state levels, income disparities between the rural and urban sectors increased 
during this period. State-level data also showed that not only had the income gap between the poorest and 
the richest states increased during the 1990s, but urban inequality increased for all the 15 major states in 
India. Inequality also alarmingly increased in the North-Eastern part of the country, where all the states 
experienced increased rural and urban poverty during this same period.
One of the reasons behind the increased income inequality observed in India in the post-reform pe-
riod has been the stagnation of employment generation in both rural and urban areas across the states. Open 
unemployment increased in most parts of the country, and the rate of growth of rural employment hit an 
all time low. Declining employment elasticity in several sectors, including agriculture, was one of the main 
reasons behind this decline. Low employment generation in the agriculture sector has also been associated 
with a steady, but signiﬁ  cant increase in casualization of the labour force in India. Due to large scale down-
sizing and privatization of public sector units, employment generation in the organized sector also suﬀ  ered. 
However, the services sector performed relatively better during this period. Th   e employment growth rate in 
this sector was higher than in other sectors of the economy. Particularly in some sub-sectors like information 
technology, communication and entertainment, employment generation and wages increased substantially in 
this period. However, these sectors employed only a very small section of the labour force, and their impact 
on the overall employment scenario has been minimal. One countervailing force to the lower employment 
generation has been increased economic migration, typically to other countries in Asia and the Middle East. 
Th   is has been especially important in certain regions and provided an important alternative source of transfer 
income to local residents through remittances. However, these ﬂ  ows have had little to do with domestic poli-
cies and more to do with international economic processes.
Th   e discussion of health and education related indicators shows that though there has been some 
progress by India in these areas, this progress has been unsatisfactory, even when compared to other devel-
oping countries. Huge inter-state disparities in health and education related indicators remain across the 
country. State involvement and investment in these sectors has historically remained very low and declined 
even further during the 1990s. Gradual withdrawal of the state from these sectors and increased reliance on 
the private sector are likely to further exacerbate the already inequitable distribution of health and education 
services in India.
A number of policies adopted during the reform period essentially increased the level of inequality 
in India. Liberalization of trade helped some sectors where India was internationally competitive, but it also 
negatively aﬀ  ected the other sectors. Th   e agriculture sector, as well as small and medium enterprises, which 
account for the bulk of employment, were the worst hit by the trade liberalization undertaken by policymak-
ers since the mid-1990s. Th  e  inﬂ  ow of FDI into India has only marginally improved gross domestic capital 
formation, but its incidence has been conﬁ  ned to some very small pockets, both geographically and secto-
rally. Th   is has increased inter-state and inter-sectoral inequalities in the country.26  DESA Working Paper No. 45
Emphasis on reduction of the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit also increased inequality in India during the reform 
period. Due to pressures from powerful lobbies, direct and indirect tax rates declined in India. Th  e  govern-
ment’s failure to reduce current expenditure implied that most of the adjustment to reduce the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit 
was carried out by reducing capital expenditure and rural expenditure generally, as well as by selling PSUs to 
generate one-time revenue. Reduction of capital expenditure reduced public investment in key infrastruc-
tural areas and social welfare schemes. In a country like India, where the level of infrastructure development 
is poor, public investment in infrastructure is critical, not only for its direct developmental eﬀ  ects, but also 
because it brings in private investment through its crowding in eﬀ  ects.
Attempts to reduce government expenditure on food subsidies and social welfare schemes have also 
had serious negative eﬀ  ects on inequality in the country. In their zeal to adopt market-oriented reform meas-
ures, Indian policymakers have tended to overlook the fact that not only the so-called ‘market economies’ of 
Europe and America, but also the industrialization success stories of East Asia, all spend a very high percent-
age of their GDP on health, education and social security. Notwithstanding the free market rhetoric, these 
countries have steadily increased their public expenditure on social services since the 1980s.
Other market-oriented reform measures, like closure of non-proﬁ  t making PSUs, have seriously 
undermined the social objectives of the PSUs and negatively aﬀ  ected employment and economic develop-
ment in some parts of the country. Th   e closure of non-proﬁ  t-making PSUs hurt the backward regions of the 
country more severely because the proﬁ  t-maximizing private sector often does not ﬁ  nd these areas economi-
cally attractive.
Opening up the economy and ﬁ  nancial sector liberalization also had major negative consequences 
for weaker sections of the population. Th   e introduction of prudential norms for private and public sector 
banks and the Basle NPA benchmark made wary banks avoid lending to borrowers in agriculture and to 
small enterprises. As a result, credit ﬂ  ows to agriculture and to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) went 
down drastically in recent years. Th   is reinforced the problems faced by these sectors due to trade liberaliza-
tion and the complete removal of quantitative restrictions on imports.
All of this points to conclusions with implications for government policy. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is the crucial 
importance of continued and increased public expenditure for productive investments in infrastructure 
as well as for social expenditures and ensuring food access. Both aggregate expenditure and the pattern of 
public expenditure are important. In addition, ﬁ  scal federalism—relations between the central and provincial 
governments—are very signiﬁ  cant in large countries like India. Methods of raising resources for government 
expenditure, such as the pattern of taxation, also impact this connection. Th   e relationships between growth 
patterns and the extent and type of employment generated have been extremely important as well. Trade 
liberalization has had dis-equalizing eﬀ  ects; while it provided more opportunities for some export activities, 
there were adverse eﬀ  ects for those employed in import-competing sectors, especially in small-scale activities. 
FDI patterns have tended to reinforce existing inequalities, possibly even more than domestic investment.Inequality in India: A survey of recent trends          27
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